For richer, for poorer: China embraces global poverty reduction? by Gerald Chan
Chan Bandung: Journal of the Global South  (2015) 2:13 








Has China embraced global poverty reduction? To what extent has it done so? China
faces three paradoxes in trying to alleviate poverty: first, the country is on the whole
getting richer, becoming one of the largest economies in the world, yet huge pockets
of extreme poverty exist in the country. Second, it wants to be taken seriously as a
responsible member of the international community. It would therefore like to be
treated as a normal aid giver helping the poor in the developing world. Yet its own
people are crying out loud for better social services at home. Third, while it wants to be
respected by others in the world, it has been accused by other countries of ignoring, if
not abusing, human rights in the Third World in its relentless search for natural
resources, trade and investments. This paper aims to unravel these paradoxes by
examining China’s foreign aid and its adherence or otherwise to the UN Millennium
Development Goals. In so doing, the paper assesses China’s unilateral approach as well
as its multilateral approach to poverty alleviation. It argues that China’s overall approach
has become more multilateral in nature but the change has been slow and
incremental. Its influence in global poverty reduction, though increasing, is still limited.
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Introduction
China’s economic growth in the past thirty-five years has dazzled many observers. Yet,
in its path to development, the country has encountered many intriguing paradoxes.
This paper examines three of these paradoxes in connection with the country’s effort to
alleviate poverty. The first one is that while the country is growing strong in aggregate
terms, it is very weak in per capital terms. There are still many poor people in remote
parts of the country and even on the outskirts of many big cities. The second paradox is
that while China wants to be taken seriously as a responsible rising power in the world, it
is being seen as irresponsible by others in many world affairs, especially in its relentless
drive to search for natural resources, trade and investments around the globe, particularly
in the Third World, while ignoring human rights abuses there. The third paradox is that
while it wants to help the global poor, it is being hamstrung by the need to look after its
own poor people at home, given its limited resources in relation to its huge population
size. How do we unravel these paradoxes? What are their implications for China’s effort
to reduce poverty, globally and domestically?Paradox I: Is China a rich country or a poor country?
China seems to be both: it is rich in aggregate terms, but poor in per capita terms.
As of early 2014, China is the second largest economy in the world after the U.S.,
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16,244,575; 8,221,015; and 5,960,269 respectively (IMF 2013). In November 2012 the
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) forecast that China
would surpass the U.S. as the largest economy by 2016, measured in purchasing-power-
parity terms (OECD 2013). On 30 April 2014 the Financial Times reported that the U.S.
was on the brink of losing its status as the world’s largest economy; it would slip behind
China in 2014, based on World Bank statistics (Financial Times 2014b). According to the
newspaper, the U.S. had been the global leader since overtaking the U.K. in 1872
(Financial Times 2014b). In terms of trade, Bloomberg reported that China surpassed
the U.S. as the world’s biggest trading nation in 2012 when measured by the sum of ex-
ports and imports (Bloomberg News 2013). In early 2013 the U.S. Commerce Department
said that American exports and imports in 2012 totalled US$3.82 trillion, while China’s
customs administration said that their country’s total trade in 2012 amounted to US$3.87
trillion. In addition, China has also become one of the most important investors around
the world. According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD), in 2012 the U.S. tops the list of the total amount of inward and outward for-
eign direct investment flows, amounting to US$167.62 billion, while China was second with
$121.08 billion, and Hong Kong third with $74.584 billion (UNCTAD 2013). The
combined total of China and Hong Kong would then overtake the U.S., although the
cross-border investment flows between China and Hong Kong are difficult to fathom.
Above all, China has the largest foreign exchange reserves, close to US$4 trillion by mid-
2014 and the amount has continued to grow over the years (Trading Economics 2014).
However, when measured in per capita terms, China is a very poor country. As of
end-2013, its per capita income is US$7,945 (UNDP 2013). Ranking in descending
order of GPD per capita among countries of the world, this income is starkly low: its
position is situated somewhere between 80 and 90a, although it has moved steadily up
the ranking order over the years. This ranking puts China in the company of such
countries as Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Namibia, and Thailand. China is of course a
country of great diversity, geographically and economically: The wealth gap is huge
between major coastal cities such as Shanghai, Beijing, Tianjin, and Guangzhou and
provinces in the central and western parts of the country. Even within many big cities, a
huge wealth gap divides the urban centres and the nearby rural areas. A huge gap also ex-
ists between local residents and migrant workers in many cities.
Economic measurements and forecasts are one thing, whose accuracy is precarious
for many well-known reasons, the quality of the living environment is quite another for
China. The country is infamous for its poor environmental record. The cost of environ-
mental damage to its economy, due to ill health or loss of production, has been estimated
to range from three to ten per cent of its GDPb. If the measurement of the quality of life
is taken into account, then China is trailing a long way behind many countries in the
world. For example, The Economist (2005) made a survey of the quality of life around the
world in 2005, and ranked China 60 out of 111 countries surveyed; the top five countries
were Ireland, Switzerland, Norway, Luxembourg, and Sweden. China trailed right behind
Venezuela and was just ahead of Vietnam.
Because of China’s regional diversity and its low per capita income, the World Bank still
regards China as a developing country. Although new applications from China to the Bank
for funding development projects in the country have been cut, the country still receives aid
from it, mainly for some long-term ongoing projects that are close to completion. This situ-
ation poses serious implications for China in applying for and receiving foreign aid from other
sources and, to a lesser extent, for it to extend its own aid to other developing countries.
Paradox II: Is China a responsible country or not?c
The answer to this question depends on how we gauge the idea of responsibility and
who decides Chan (2006, 2014). There is apparently no single way to measure state re-
sponsibility in global affairs that would be acceptable to all concerned or to the absolute
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regarded as the axiom. Anarchy, however, does not mean total chaos, as order exists in
international society in the presence of diplomacy, rules, and international institutions, as
Hedley Bull had cogently argued in his well-known book entitled The Anarchical Society
(Bull 2002).
In the first place, responsibility is a nebulous concept. It can be viewed in so many
ways, not least in terms of the difference between domestic and international responsibil-
ities. Domestically, a government, in this case China, given its political system, can decide
more or less within its own jurisdiction what constitutes domestic responsibility, although
this is subject to some checks and balances by various actors, both inside and outside of
the country, especially in such area as human rights. Internationally, as the world is be-
ing treated as an anarchical society, it is extremely difficult to find a universally accept-
able, single authority to decide whether one country is globally responsible or not, and
in what area, in what way, and at what time. The one organisation that comes close to
being regarded as a credible authority in this respect is the United Nations, which in
substance is an assembly of states, and whose authority still from time to time comes
under the challenge of some its members, big or small. To China, multilateral organi-
sations have become important forums for making major decisions affecting global se-
curity. At the global level, the Security Council of the United Nations is responsible
for making decisions on peacekeeping and the maintenance of global security. At the
regional level, major regional organisations are regarded by China as major instruments
for making regional peace and stability, for example, the African Union, the Arab League,
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and others. As a result of the different
understandings of responsibility in world affairs, whether or not China is a respon-
sible state in dealing with poverty reduction domestically and internationally is open
to debate.
Paradox III: Is China helping the global poor while neglecting its own
destitute?
No, not at least according to its official view, nor according to many outside observers, al-
though domestic poverty remains a nagging problem for China. The reason why the an-
swer is no can be gauged from the progress that China has made in tackling poverty at
home. According to the United Nations Development Programme UNDP (2014a), China
has lifted 500 million of its people out of abject poverty in the past three decades or so.
Considering China’s current population of around 1,353 million (UNDP 2014b), this means
that more than a third of the people in China have been taken out of poverty, or roughly
one fifteenth of humankind. This is no mean achievement. No wonder Chinese officials
have often said that China is contributing to global poverty reduction by eliminating do-
mestic poverty, treating China’s own domestic problem as a global problem. However, the
sheer size of China’s population means that there are still many people suffering from the
negative impact of poverty such as the lack of access to proper health care and education.
In addition, the widening gulf between the rich and the poor in the country has continued
to tarnish its record of poverty reduction at home.
The Guardian newspaper (Guardian 2014), citing the research done by Peking Uni-
versity, says that a third of China’s wealth is held by one per cent of its citizens and the
poorest quarter of Chinese citizens owns only one per cent of the country’s wealth. The
country’s Gini coefficient, a widely used indicator of economic inequality, has grown
sharply over the past two decades. (A Gini coefficient of zero represents absolute equal-
ity, while one represents absolute inequality). About twenty years ago, China’s Gini co-
efficient for family net wealth was 0.45, but by 2012 it had risen to 0.73. In
comparison, the U.S. has a Gini coefficient of 0.39, the U.K. 0.34, and Italy 0.32.
The three paradoxes discussed above will continue to pose significant challenges to
China in its engagement with the governance of poverty reduction around the world, in
terms of the country’s status and standing (rich or poor), its intentions and capabilities
Chan Bandung: Journal of the Global South  (2015) 2:13 Page 4 of 11to deal with poverty alleviation (responsible or not), and its policy choices (global or do-
mestic). How these three paradoxes are going to play out, individually and collectively, will
affect the way China deals with poverty reduction in the world, the subject of attention in
the rest of this paper.
Living with paradoxes: How has China engaged global poverty reduction?
China’s engagement with global poverty reduction can best be seen from its involvement in
multilateral coordination rather than through its unilateral or bilateral approach. Al-
though unilateral or bilateral approach still forms an integral part of China’s effort to re-
duce global poverty, it is in many ways geared towards enhancing China’s national
interests, at least seen by many aid recipients and aid donors. China’s multilateral ap-
proach in this area, however, shows China’s effort to become a concerned member of the
aid community, taking collective action to deal with poverty and hunger worldwide. To
examine China’s multilateral approach, this paper focuses on three major international or-
ganisations and the South-South Programme.
The South-South Programme is a relatively new initiative that China and other
emerging economies have initiated to help the poor in the Third World, making con-
tributions as befitting rising economies and as responsible members of the international
community. The three major international organisations in this study include the World
Bank, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, and the United Na-
tions Development Programme. The World Bank is the world’s leading development bank
whose mandate is to assist the development of those countries in need, mainly through
project financing. The OECD is an organisation formed by the countries in the West,
mainly in Europe, to help enhance the economic and social well-being of those countries
in need. And the UNDP is a major development agency of the UN, well known for its
work in promoting the UN Millennium Development Goals to help member countries to
develop in a comprehensive way, with poverty reduction as the top priority.
(a) The World Bank
The World Bank was formed as the premier organisation to help countries to recon-
struct and develop after the destruction caused by the Second World War, especially
those in Europe. China joined the World Bank (and the IMF) in 1980. It has since
benefited from the Bank’s cheap loans for developing many projects in the initial phase
of its opening up to the outside world, subsequent to the adoption of a reform policy
in 1978. In addition, the Bank has transferred much technology and information to
China to help the country to build up its infrastructural capacity. In 2007/08 the Bank
extended US$1.5134 billion to support ten development projects in the country, mak-
ing a cumulative total of $43.688 billion covering 296 projects (MOFA 2010).
On the other hand, in the past decade or so, China began to extend substantial bilat-
eral aid to some African countries after a long pause caused by the Cultural Revolution
in the 1960s. Many observers see this move as a way for China to secure valuable raw
materials for its industries. Some observers in the West have accused China of turning
a blind eye to the flagrant human-rights violations committed by some African govern-
ments, while the World Bank faces questions as to why it has continued to offer loans to
a fast-growing China (Karns and Mingst 2010). The then President of the World Bank,
Robert Zoellick, called on China to coordinate its support to the world’s poor with the rest
of the international community (read the West and the World Bank). China’s increasing
bilateral assistance extended to poor developing countries around the world with rela-
tively few political strings attached has begun to pose a challenge to the World Bank,
since these recipient countries can now turn to an alternative source of help without abid-
ing by the stringent conditions of good governance set by multilateral financial institu-
tions like the World Bank and the IMF. At the end of 2007 China said it would start
donating to the World Bank’s main concessional loans fund for poor countries by joining
the Bank’s International Development Association. In a visit to Beijing in September
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cooperation with the Bank (Xinhua 2013).
Chinese economist Justin Yifu Lin’s tenure as the Chief Economist and Senior Vice-
President of the World Bank from 2008 to 2013 has added a new twist to the Bank’s
ideology. Lin’s appointment marked a subtle shift, at least in small measures and in theor-
etical terms, of the Bank’s free-market orthodoxy, as Lin, though trained at Chicago, is a
firm believer in the important role played by the state, regarding it as the most important
institution in the economy (New York Times 2008). His appointment was seen by some
observers as a welcoming move long overdue. It was welcoming to many African coun-
tries which saw the development recipe handed down by the Bank, known otherwise as
the ‘Washington Consensus’, as ill-conceived and condescending. It was long over-
due as China has grown fast in the world economy during the past three decades
or so. Robert Zoellick’s remark in 2005, while serving as U.S. deputy secretary of
state, that a rising China should become a responsible stakeholder in the global sys-
tem, was a telling foresight (New York Times 2008). Lin’s appointment, though
attracting high publicity, represented a small change which might not mean a lot to
the way the World Bank conducts its business (as usual). His stint of employment
at the Bank, however, might have paved the way for China’s increasing identification
with and involvement in the Bank’s activities.
One nagging problem that China has with the existing structure of the World Bank
is the distribution of political power within the agency. According to a UN Univer-
sity report on global governance, a very large proportion of the voting rights in the
World Bank are vested in the hands of a very small number of industrialised coun-
tries, the major shareholders, in terms of their paid-up capital (U.N. University
2001). As of November 2010 China held 2.85% of the Bank’s shares and 2.78% of
its voting rights, ranking sixth among the 186 member states of the Bankd. (This dis-
tribution of voting rights has remained more or less the same up to mid-2014, as the
Bank has failed to implement its policy change agreed to in April 2010 due to the blocking
by the U.S. Congress for domestic reasons such as the country’s sluggish economy and the
attention and priority paid to local elections. A similar situation has occurred in the IMF).
In contrast, a large number of developing countries and transitional economies are vested
with a small proportion of the voting rights, even though they are the principal stake-
holders, as interest payments by them provide a large part of the Bank’s source of income.
Subsequent to the financial crisis of 2007-9, some major economies in the West en-
courage China to increase its financial contribution to the Bank to enhance the Bank’s
liquidity and hence its capacity to lend. China seems willing to do so, on the condition
that its contribution could be reflected in its increasing voting power and its greater
say in the Bank’s decision making. In the World Bank Spring meeting in April 2010,
the 186 member states agreed to boost the capital of the International Bank for Recon-
struction and Development, one of the four major institutions making up the Bank, by
US$86.2 billion, of which $5.1 billion were paid-in capital, in return for increasing the
voting rights of developing and transition countries at the expense of Japan and some
European countries. China’s voting power (still subject to ratification of the changes by
member countries, especially the U.S., as of mid-2014) has subsequently risen to a po-
tential rate of 4.42%, ranking third after the U.S. (15.85%) and Japan (6.84%) (see
Figure 1). The combined voting rights of Germany, France and the UK would have
been reduced to 11.5% from 13.08%. But the (Group of 24 2011) developing countriese
wished to have a system that would automatically revise the voting rights in accordance
to transformations in the relative economic powers between the developed and devel-
oping worlds. Yan Fang of China University of Political Science and Law (in Beijing)
even argues that ‘China should at least be above Japan in terms of voting power’, given
the fact that China took over Japan to become the second-largest economy in the world
in 2010 (Financial Times 2010; China Daily 2010; World Bank 2010b)f. The next quota
review, however, will not be due until 2015. It is expected that this 2015 review will be
Figure 1 China’s growing power in the World Bank. Source: Adapted from China Daily 2010 (accessed 9
May 2014).
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made in the earlier round of review in 2010.
(b) The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
The OECD was formed in 1961 to promote cooperation and reconstruction among
European economies in order to avoid the repeat of conflict and war in Europe. Its pre-
decessor, the OEEC (Organisation for European Economic Cooperation) was formed in
1948 to coordinate with the U.S. Marshall Plan to help (Western) Europe reconstruct it-
self after the ravage of the Second World War. By convention, the OECD is a Western
club, with members coming from liberal democracies. China is not a liberal democracy,
and is therefore not strictly qualified to become a member, despite its increasing eco-
nomic clout around the world. The OECD, however, wants to include China in its global
economic policy deliberations, but find it difficult to include China as a member because
of its lack of democratic credentials. China, on the other hand, wants to be involved in
global economic policy making, but it wants to avoid being seen by fellow developing
countries to be joining the club of the rich and so deserting the global poor. It also may
want to avoid its hands being tied by the stringent rules of membership so as to maintain
a greater degree of freedom acting outside of the group. But proper economic policy can-
not be coordinated globally without the participation of China, as the country is the
world’s second biggest economy poised to become the largest.
A working relationship was eventually found to accommodate China in the OECD:g. In
October 1995 the OECD Council agreed to establish a programme of dialogue and co-
operation with China. Since then, the OECD has contributed to policy reform in China by
sharing its member countries’ experiences in a wide range of areas, including trade and
investment, science and technology, agriculture, environmental protection, education, cor-
porate governance, and many more. In response, China has put its own policy experiences
on the table for scrutiny and discussion by OECD member countries. For example, China’s
experiences in managing small- and medium-sized enterprises have been of use to the
OECD in its outreach programme to help other developing countries. The OECD Council
at Ministerial level adopted a resolution on 16 May 2007 to strengthen cooperation with
China, as well as other emerging economies such as Brazil, India, Indonesia and South
Africa, through a programme of enhanced engagement. Enhanced engagement is different
from accession to the OECD, but it has the potential to lead to membership in future. China
has been invited to participate as a regular observer to some OECD committees or working
groups. In return, the country has helped the OECD in its global action by hosting OECD
events in China and by participating in the OECD’s regional activities in Asia.
At present China is one of the many non-member economies, including Taiwan, with
which the OECD has working relationships. The political competition between China and
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Taiwan has maintained a working relationship with the Development Assistance Commit-
tee (DAC), the foreign direct assistance arm of the OECD. Since the early 1990s, Taiwan
and the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development have worked together to
promote democracy and economic development in countries covered by the Bank’s opera-
tions (Taipei Times 2011). Taiwan has been submitting reports of its foreign aid on an an-
nual basis to the OECD since 2004, and the OECD has included aid statistics of Taiwan
in its aid reports. Taiwan, under the name ‘Chinese Taipei’, is an observer to some of
the committees of the OECD, including the Competition Committee (since 2001) and
the Steel Committee (since 2005). As non-member economies, both Taiwan and China
are competing for participation in committees and in other OECD sub-groups such as
working parties and working groups. Both participated in high-level steel talks and in the
special negotiating group on a ship-building agreement. Both eventually became observers
of the Steel Committee in 2005, although China’s status was a full participant whereas
Taiwan was not. China has been regularly invited by the OECD to attend various
committee meetings and events, whereas Taiwan’s invitations are based on ad-hoc
arrangements. Taiwan’s desire to increase its activities in various committees as an
observer has been dwarfed by China’s opposition (WikiLeaks 2013). Efforts aimed at
global poverty reduction are sometimes compromised by political considerations.
(c) The United Nations Development Programme
The UNDP is one of the largest agencies of the UN system, in terms of its aid budget.
China began to participate in its activities starting from 1972, a year after the country
became a member of the United Nations. The UNDP is one of the earliest UN agencies
to start work in China, in fact in 1979, when China began to open up and to reform under
former leader Deng Xiaoping. Among the various programmes that the UNDP works in
China is poverty alleviation. The UNDP often cites the success made by China in lift-
ing 500 million people out of extreme poverty in the past thirty years or so as a major
achievement (UNDP 2014a). China works with the UNDP to pass on China’s experi-
ence and technological know-how to other developing countries under the so-called
South-South cooperation, in an agreement signed between China and the UNDP in
2010. This was the first such agreement that China signed with a partner, multilat-
erally or bilaterally (UNDP 2014c), in a trilateral arrangement that involves aid recipi-
ents as the third party. Such trilateral programmes have become a popular form of
cooperation in recent years in the global aid community. China supports the achieve-
ment of the eight UN Millennium Development Goals, the first and foremost goal be-
ing poverty reduction around the world.
In August 2014 UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon set up an Independent Expert
Advisory Group on the Data Revolution for Sustainable Development. The purpose is
to advise him on the future development agenda beyond 2015 to succeed the UN
Millennium Goals. The advisory group consists of twenty-four experts drawn from civil
society, the private sector, academics, governments and international organisations (UN
News Centre 2014). The fact that one of the two co-chairs of the group is Robin Li of
China suggests that China is supportive of the UN and the UNDP in framing the future
global development programme.
(d) South-South Cooperation
China has started to push forth this kind of cooperation, not only with the UNDP, but
also with other emerging economies, in formulating coordinated effort to help the
Third World. The country published its first white paper on foreign aid in April 2011.
In the same year India announced that the Indian Agency for Partnership in Develop-
ment would oversee an aid budget of over US$11 billion in the next five to seven years
(Guardian Weekly 2011). All the aid policies of these emerging economies share a simi-
lar aim of boosting South-South cooperation. For example, China’s aid aims to establish
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solidarity and cooperation among Latin-American countries and Portuguese-speaking
countries in Africa; Russia, ‘re-emerging’ from the demise of the Soviet Union, a major
donor to socialist countries before, says it wants to be a good neighbour by supporting
low-income countries (Guardian Weekly 2011).
At a BRICS summit meeting held in Durban in March 2013, leaders agreed to set up
a collective development fund, known to some observers as the BRICS bank, to help
the Third World poor, and in addition a financial reserve fund, modelled upon the
Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralisation (CMIM) (Chan 2012), to support developing
countries if they face emergency financial difficulties. It is reported that the BRICS bank
will have an initial capital of US$50 billion; and the reserve fund will pool together
$100 billion, with $41 billion from China, $18 billion each from Russia, India and
Brazil, and $5 billion from South Africa (Bretton Woods Project 2013). It is also re-
ported that, Chen Yuan, the Governor of the state-owned China Development Bank for
fifteen years, would leave his post to spearhead the organising of the BRICS bank
(Caixin 2013).
At the BRICS summit held in Fortaleza, Brazil, in July 2014, the group decided to set
up the new development bank in Shanghai, with an initial capital of US$50 billion, ris-
ing to $100 billion and with a separate $100 billion Contingent Reserve Arrangement.
India will assume the presidency of the bank for the first six years, followed by rotating
terms for Brazil and Russia. The BRICS countries contain 40% of the world’s population
and account for 20% of global economic output. China alone represents 70% of the col-
lective GNP of the BRICS (International New York Times 2014).
The setting up of the BRICS bank is seen by many observers as a rivalry to the World
Bank and the IMF, but the World Bank President Dr Jim Yong Kim has a more consid-
ered view. He says that new entrants like the BRICS bank will help the World Bank
battle poverty and spur growth rather than threaten its position. He says that the need
for new investments in infrastructure would be massive, with such funding needs in de-
veloping countries estimated at US$1 trillion a year, while the World Bank could only
offer US$60 billion in 2013 (South China Morning Post 2014).
Drawing on the favourable reception of CMIM by member states, in April 2014 the
Asian Development Bank called for the establishment of a similar scheme to deal with
natural disasters in the Asian region (Interaksyon 2014). At an APEC summit held in Bali,
Indonesia, in October 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping proposed the establishment
of an Asian Infrastructural Investment Bank (AIIB) to integrate the economies of Asian
countries. The suggested paid-up capital would be US$100 billion, with China making
a major contribution (Financial Times 2014d). As of mid-2014, twenty-two countries, in-
cluding several wealthy states in the Middle East, have shown interest in the multilat-
eral lender. This suggested amount is slightly less than two thirds that of the Asian
Development Bank (ADB). Although the AIIB is still on paper, it seems to have the fu-
ture potential of taking away some of the functions and influence of the ADB, where
Japan and the U.S. are major shareholders, holding respectively 15.7% and 15.6% of
the shares of the ADB, with China trailing far behind with 5.47% (Bloomberg News
2014). The ADB estimates that Asia will need $800 billion a year of infrastructure in-
vestment between 2014 and 2020, but it can only lend $10 billion a year for infra-
structure, theoretically providing scope for other entities such as the AIIB to
contribute. Takehido Nakao, the President of the ADB, has cautiously welcomed
China’s proposal to establish the AIIB (Financial Times 2014d).
Another recent attempt by China to enhance its multilateral approach to South-South
cooperation is the launch in May 2014 of an investment plan called ‘Africa China Growing
Together’ fund. The fund, established by China and the African Development Bank, is
worth US$2 billion. It was set up subsequent to a high-profile visit by Chinese Premier Li
Keqiang to four African countries (Ethiopia, Nigeria, Angola, and Kenya) earlier in the
month. This investment is seen as a change of tack by China from a bilateral approach
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transparent, multilateral way (Financial Times 2014a). The amount of the fund, how-
ever, is dwarfed by China’s US$27.7 billion worth of investments across Africa (Wall
Street Journal 2014).
Through working with the three major international organisations (the World Bank,
the OECD, and the UNDP) discussed above and with other emerging economies and de-
veloping countries in South-South cooperation, China has demonstrated that it is charting
a course for itself to become a member of the international community doing its part in
poverty alleviation, both domestically and internationally. It main focus is to help its
own poor people as well as those in the Third World. It coordinates such work with
countries rich or emerging, organisations that are run by the developed West or by
the developing world. Its draw card is its huge foreign exchange reserves, reaching an
all-time high of nearly US$4 trillion in the first quarter of 2014, according to the
Financial Times (2014c). Part of this reserve could potentially be used to help the poor
while financing its economic growth. In some ways, China has beaten a new path in
global poverty reduction. Apart from working with some traditional aid donors like
those in the OECD countries, it has also gradually engaged with some new inter-
national aid agencies and emerging economies to coordinate an increasing flow of for-
eign aid from these economies.Conclusions
This paper sets out to ask this question: Has China embraced global poverty reduction?
Judging from the fact that the People’s Republic of China was born a poor country in
1949 and has since struggled to become a relatively well-off society (xiao kang or 小康),
the fact that it has successfully lifted some 500 million people out of abject poverty in the
past thirty years or so, and the fact that it has identified itself with the developing world
and has taken concrete steps to boost South-South cooperation, it does seem that China
has embraced global poverty reduction. This is so, despite the fact that it has continued to
face the three major paradoxes, as discussed in the early part of the paper. Whether China
is a rich country or a poor one, whether it is responsible or not, and whether it has struck
a proper balance between helping its own poor people and those outside, it does seem
that China is increasingly doing its part to alleviate poverty. These paradoxes sometimes
present distractions to China’s attention to global poverty reduction and put obstacles
across its path to slow down its assistance to the developing world, but they have not pre-
vented China from staying on its developmental course. To what extent China embraces
global poverty reduction becomes a tricky question. How to measure China’s role in this
respect is by no means easy. As China wants to be seen as a responsible rising power, it is
safe to assume that the country wants to engage or at least to be seen to be engaging with
global poverty reduction. The extent to which it does so can then become an issue of
assessing China’s altruistic behaviour and its capability to help others, an issue that de-
serves further enquiry. At least at present China is increasingly involved in global poverty
reduction.Endnotes
aWhether it is by IMF ranking, or by that of the World Bank, or by the UN.
bThe Guardian (2010) quotes a figure of 3%, while the New York Times (2013) 3.5%,
the World Bank (2013) 4.3%, and the China Daily (2006) 10%.
cA more elaborative analysis can be found in Chan (2006), chapter 2, pp. 33-62. See also
Gao (2013).
dSee MOFA (2010). For a full table of the subscriptions and voting power of the 186
member countries of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development as of
1 November 2010, see World Bank (2010a).
Chan Bandung: Journal of the Global South  (2015) 2:13 Page 10 of 11eIts official name is the Intergovernmental Group of Twenty-Four on International
Monetary Affairs and Development (G-24) and was established in 1971. China is an ob-
server country. Accessed July 12, 2011, at http://www.g24.org.
fThe voting powers of the member states of the IBRD before the reform are shown in
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/BODINT/Resources/278027-1215524804501/IBRD-
CountryVotingTable.pdf (accessed 27 April 2010). The quote is from Xin, ‘China gains
more say in World Bank’. China is not a formal member of the G24 but has been a ‘special
invitee’ since 1981 (http://www.g24.org).
gThe rest of this paragraph draws its sources from the OECD (2014).
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